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The Incentives for Tax Planning
Abstract: We use a proprietary data set with detailed executive compensation
information to examine the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and
GAAP and cash effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness.
We find that the incentive compensation of the tax director exhibits a strong negative
relationship with the GAAP effective tax rate, but little relationship with the other tax
attributes. We interpret these results as indicating that tax directors are provided with
incentives to reduce the level of tax expense reported in the financial statements.
Keywords: tax director incentives; equity incentives; effective tax rate; book-tax
difference
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the type of tax planning included in tax directors’
compensation contracts. Using detailed data on tax director incentive compensation, we
examine whether the incentives provided to tax directors are associated with lower
effective tax rates and/or a wider book-tax gap. We also examine whether tax director
incentives are more strongly linked to measures of the impact of taxes on cash flows (i.e.,
cash effective tax rates and taxable income) or earnings (i.e., GAAP effective tax rates
and pre-tax book income). Finally, we investigate whether tax director incentives are
associated with proxies for aggressive tax planning.
Our study complements and extends the recent literature that links tax planning
with top executive incentive compensation (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Rego and
Wilson, 2010) and executive/corporate culture (e.g., Frank et al., 2009; Dyreng et al.,
2010).1 Although these studies show that both the incentives of top management and
corporate culture have a significant impact on effective tax rates, it is not clear whether
top management directly engages in tax planning or whether the documented tax effects
are a byproduct of the investing, financing, and operating decisions made within the firm.
For example, an observed relationship between top management’s incentives and
measures of tax planning may be an indirect outcome of the investment decision rather
than from deliberate tax planning. To understand the link between performance measures
and observed tax attributes, it is necessary to explicitly consider the incentive
compensation of the tax director, who is the executive charged with overseeing the firm’s
tax function. However, an alternative scenario is that all tax planning decisions are
1

This literature suggests that a firm’s culture, representing the shared beliefs within the firm regarding the
optimal course of action, can lead to endemic aggressiveness in all of a firm’s business decisions, including
the tax function (e.g., Cronqvist et al., 2007).
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merely dictated by top management to the tax director, who has no ability to
independently affect firm behavior. If tax planning is a role merely encompassed in top
management’s duties, then we might not observe an association between tax director
incentives and measures of tax planning after controlling for the incentives of top
management.
To investigate the relative importance of various measures of tax planning in tax
director incentive compensation contracts, we use a proprietary data set that includes
detailed compensation information for many executives, including the members of the tax
department, for a sizeable sample of mostly large U.S. firms. This unique data exhibits
several advantages relative to that used in prior research. First, it allows us to directly
measure the incentive compensation of the executives who are directly responsible for the
firm’s tax function. Second, it provides us with information about the incentive
compensation of other members of the management team. This within-firm benchmark
allows us to identify the attributes of the compensation plan that are unique to tax
directors, as opposed to the general compensation policy of the firm.
We first examine the association between executive incentives and the GAAP and
Cash effective tax rates (ETRs). Recent research presents evidence that variation in
corporate tax planning is captured by ETRs (Dyreng et al., 2008; Robinson et al., 2010).
We find a strong negative relationship between tax director incentives and the GAAP
ETR and no relationship between tax director incentives and the Cash ETR. These results
indicate that tax directors are provided with incentives to reduce the tax expense reported
in the financial statements. Thus, our findings are consistent with the GAAP ETR being a
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more informative measure of the tax director’s actions and, accordingly, it is allocated
more weight in the incentive compensation contract
We next examine the book-tax gap, because this measure has recently received
considerable attention from the U.S. Treasury, regulators, and academics. We find no
evidence of a relationship between tax director incentive compensation and the spread
between pre-tax book income and taxable income. Since the book-tax gap is defined as
the difference between pre-tax book income and taxable income, there are econometric
reasons to disaggregate this variable into its two components (i.e., pre-tax book income
and taxable income). In addition, separating the book-tax gap allows us to look for
evidence of conforming tax planning (i.e., where tax planning reduces both book and tax
income). The results of this analysis provide no evidence of an association between the
incentive compensation of tax directors and lower taxable income.
Finally, we examine the relationship between tax director incentive compensation
and two measures developed to explicitly capture tax aggressiveness: a modified version
of Frank et al.’s (2009) DTAX measure and Wilson’s (2009) measure of tax sheltering.
We find no evidence that tax directors’ incentive compensation is associated with either
measure of tax aggressiveness. Collectively, our results indicate that tax directors are
provided incentives to reduce the level of tax expense reported in the financial
statements, but provide little support for the notion that tax directors are compensated on
the basis of the book-tax gap, the cash effective tax rate, or various measures of “tax
aggressiveness.”
The remainder of the paper consists of the following seven sections. Section 2
provides a description of the possible roles of the tax director, and Section 3 reviews the
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prior empirical literature on tax planning. Section 4 describes our proprietary sample and
other data used in our analysis. We develop our variable measurement and
methodological approach in Section 5. Our results are presented in Section 6, and
sensitivity analyses are provided in Section 7. Conclusions and summary comments are
provided in Section 8.

2. Role of the Tax Director
Although tax directors are responsible for one of the firm’s largest outflows of
cash and one of the largest expenses on the income statement, little is known about how
these executives are compensated. Since tax directors are rarely among the top five
highest paid executives, information about their annual compensation and equity holdings
is not available in annual proxy (Form DEF 14A) filings. Therefore, researchers are
typically unable to directly observe the parameters of tax director incentive pay.
The tax director fills at least three roles. First, the tax director is responsible for
compliance. Since multinational firms are typically required to file thousands of tax
forms annually, it is not unreasonable to infer that compliance is the tax director’s
primary duty. Second, the tax director may serve as an advisor to the firm’s senior
executives by providing expertise in minimizing the tax cost of the firm’s operating,
financing, and investing activities. As an advisor, the tax director would be present when
strategic investment decisions are made but may not be responsible for selecting the
investments. Third, the tax director can be charged with actively pursuing tax planning
opportunities by generating investment opportunities where the net present value of the
project derives solely from tax benefits. We view this third role, termed the “active
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planning” role, as relatively more tax aggressive than the other two advisory roles.2 It is
difficult to empirically distinguish the advisor from the active planner, as both roles could
yield lower tax obligations, and there can easily be an overlap in duties.
In terms of selecting the compensation contract for the tax director, traditional
agency theory suggests that compensation should be based on performance measures that
are controllable by the agent (Holmstrom, 1979; Lambert, 2001). Therefore, if the tax
director’s primary responsibility is compliance, then the incentive component of pay
should not be based on cash flow or earnings objectives (i.e., there are more direct
measures of tax director effort, such as fines paid for noncompliance). On the other hand,
the incentive compensation of a tax advisor and an active planner should be a function of
the firm’s financial attributes, since these performance measures are, in part, controllable
by these types of tax directors.
Our characterization of the various roles of the tax director is consistent with the
Tax Executive Institute, Inc.’s (TEI) 2004-2005 Corporate Tax Department Survey,
which provides information on several dimensions of the operations of firms’ tax
departments.3 This document is the compilation of the responses of approximately 1,300
tax departments (of which 945 were at publicly traded firms), representing a 57%
response rate, to a mid-2004 survey generated by a consulting firm. Although the survey

2

Clearly, the advisory role can also generate positive net present value for the firm. However, we view the
advisor as effectively reducing the tax cost of an incremental investment opportunity (i.e., the net present
value of the project includes non-tax components). A tax advisor does not typically undertake transactions
that fail the business purpose test (i.e., there are non-tax benefits to the transaction). In contrast, an active
planner will need to justify why there are benefits beyond the tax attributes of the transaction (see Gregory
v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)). As Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) point out, there is no universally
accepted definition of tax aggressiveness. So we are left to make an (albeit coarse) attempt at segregating
tax planning from tax aggressiveness for the purposes of our analysis.
3
The Tax Executives Institute is a professional organization of roughly 5,000 business executives who are
responsible for taxation matters. The TEI survey data is separate from the proprietary data used later in our
analysis.
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focuses on identifying the specific duties of the tax departments (e.g., time spent on
foreign versus domestic compliance, types of entities responsible for, and nexus issues),
it does provide descriptive information on the organization of the tax department and
some performance metrics of tax department personnel.
The senior tax executives of the public survey respondents typically hold the title
of tax director (40%) or vice president (35%) (described in aggregate hereafter as tax
directors), and those titles suggest that these individuals hold high level positions in their
respective firms. Sixty-five percent of the tax directors report to the chief financial
officer. The majority (60%) of public companies report that their tax function is
centralized and globally integrated, so the tax director is responsible for taxes worldwide.
In terms of specific tasks, the majority of the tax director’s time is spent doing research
(33%) and compliance (28%).4 The average tax director spends 9% of his or her time on
the tax provision and 8% of his or her time on tax audits. In terms of the average tax
department’s budget, 60% is allocated toward compensation and 20% toward outside
consultants. Finally, tax directors appear involved in the overall operations of the firm, as
the survey reports that tax directors spend 9% of their time aiding in operational issues of
the firm (including governance and Sarbanes-Oxley compliance).
The TEI Survey also provides some descriptive information on the performance
metrics of a firm’s top tax executive. Seventy-one percent of the survey’s senior tax
executives of public companies reported that “lack of surprises” was used by senior
management to evaluate their performance. Since the effective tax rate (63%) is of
slightly more importance than generating cash savings (57%) for performance evaluation,
it appears that income statement surprises could potentially dominate cash flow surprises.
4

Note that time on research includes 8.1% of their time related to mergers and acquisitions.
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Note that the cash savings is not necessarily solely attributable to taxes, as only 49% of
respondents indicated that they were evaluated on the basis of cash taxes. Although
anecdotal, our conversations with 12 tax directors suggest that their primary performance
metric was “economic value added,” as measured by financial statement earnings.
However, only 19% of the tax directors surveyed agreed. Finally, the TEI survey reports
that only 30% of the incentive compensation of executives other than the tax director was
based on after-tax measures.
Our analysis is based on the maintained assumption that the tax director is not the
primary executive charged with selecting the firm’s investment activity. Although tax
directors are involved in transaction planning and investment location decisions, their
role appears to be primarily as an advisor. This characterization is consistent with the TEI
survey evidence documenting that the majority of the tax director’s time involves tasks
related to return compliance and research. In later tests, we attempt to separate out the
advisory role from the active planner role by studying specific measures intended to
proxy for aggressive tax planning. To the extent that there is overlap between the duties
of tax directors and other senior executives, our analyses should yield similar associations
between our measures of tax planning and the incentives of the other executives. As we
discuss below, the statistical differences observed across executive positions is a key
feature of our methodological approach.

3. Prior Literature
3.1. Executive incentives and financial and tax reporting
In contrast to the fairly extensive literature on incentives and financial
misreporting, there is relatively little work linking executives’ incentives with tax
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aggressiveness.5 Slemrod (2004) develops the idea that shareholders select the level of
tax aggressiveness by linking tax manager compensation with effective tax rates or stock
price. However, one serious limitation in this model is that shareholders cannot observe
the compensation contract or know whether managers are engaging in legal tax planning
or illegal tax evasion. Thus, inappropriate aggressive behavior by the tax director
constitutes a “hidden action,” because tax returns are not disclosed to investors (see
Crocker and Slemrod, 2005), and shareholders do not know whether to alter the
executive’s compensation contract until after the firm is penalized. In addition, it is
difficult to contract on tax evasion, since the behavior is illegal and therefore would
render any contract that is a function of this outcome unenforceable by the courts (Chen
and Chu, 2005). Ultimately, Slemrod (2004) suggests that corporate tax noncompliance
(tax evasion) could be the result of the design of incentive compensation plans.
For the purposes of our study, a shortcoming of the theoretical literature
investigating the link between incentives and tax planning is that it fails to address the
fact that large public firms are typically not assessed fines or penalties upon audit. Most
settlements are made with the taxing authorities at a fraction of the dollar amount of the
original assessment.6 Therefore, non-evasive but aggressive tax planning can be viewed

5

See Armstrong et al. (2010) for a review of the literature on executives’ incentives for financial
misreporting. Much of the extant work focuses on whether equity incentives align managers’ interests with
respect to financial reporting with those of shareholders, or whether equity incentives instead induce
managers to manipulate accounting information for personal gain. More recently, a number of studies,
including Feng et al. (2009) and Jiang et al. (2010), examine the relationship between the incentives of the
CFO and earnings management. Jiang et al. (2010) argue that “because CFOs’ primary responsibility is
financial reporting … CFO equity incentives should play a stronger role than those of the CEO in earnings
management.” This rationale for examining CFOs’ incentives is analogous to our reasoning for examining
the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and the firm’s tax attributes.
6
For example, GlaxoSmithKline PLC (Glaxo) settled a transfer pricing audit with the IRS for $3.4 billion.
According to Glaxo’s 20-F filings and the IRS’s press release, the payment was made to cover “back taxes
and interest” – no penalties were assessed. Press reports suggest that Glaxo settled for about 60% of the
original assessment. Further, Glaxo reported in its 20-F filing that the after-tax cost of the settlement was
$3.1 billion, suggesting that interest was roughly $1 billion of the settlement (assuming a 30% tax rate).
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as merely a borrowing arrangement with tax authorities. These models also do not
consider the nature of the underlying tax planning (temporary versus permanent tax
deductions) and the tax planning’s impact on the financial statements. The reversal of a
permanent tax deduction will have a much larger impact on a firm’s GAAP ETR than
will a reversal of a temporary tax deduction. Hence, we need models that jointly consider
both the cash flows and earnings implications of tax planning when considering optimal
tax director incentives. Finally, note that both Crocker and Slemrod (2005) and Chen and
Chu (2005) focus on incentives and tax evasion rather than on linking incentives to
general tax director planning duties that affect either earnings or cash flows.
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) develop a model linking equity-based
compensation and aggressive tax planning. They argue that there are complementarities
between tax sheltering and rent extraction that imply that incentives lead to more
sheltering behavior in better governed firms. Although equity incentives can motivate
managers to increase tax sheltering, this decision will also lead to fewer opportunities for
managers to engage in rent extraction. Thus, the relationship between equity-based
compensation and tax sheltering is theoretically ambiguous.7
There is also a growing related literature that investigates whether corporate
culture and individual managers influence a firm’s level of tax aggressiveness. Frank et
Since the dispute covered the period from 1989 to 2005, a rough estimate of the pre-tax interest rate on the
settlement is 4.5% (or 3.2%, after taxes), assuming an eight year interest accrual period. If we consider that
the IRS effectively forgave 40% of the assessment, then the effective borrowing rate is actually negative,
since the initial “loan” from the government was for $4 billion (= 2.4 / 0.6) and the final payment was only
$3.4 billion. In addition, the IRS Data Book (see Tables 9a and 17 for 2008 and 2009) provides an analysis
of the amount of penalties assessed. Overall, for incorporated business, penalties appear to constitute only
1.45% (0.56%) of the additional taxes due in 2008 (2009). In addition, 32% (40%) of the corporate
accuracy-related penalties assessed are abated in 2008 (2009).
7
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that any directional prediction for the association between tax
planning and equity incentives is conditional on the firm’s governance structure. However, it is not clear
how the tax director would be able to extract rents from the firm. As pointed out in footnote 6, even
detected aggressive tax planning can be a positive net present value project that benefits shareholders.
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al. (2009) argue that a positive relationship between aggressive financial and tax
reporting is consistent with a generally aggressive corporate “tone and culture.”
Ultimately, they find evidence of a positive relationship between earnings management
and tax planning and that the market appears to reward this aggressiveness. However,
they do not find meaningful evidence that the CEO and CFO are provided with incentives
to undertake such behavior.
Phillips (2003) investigates whether compensating managers on a pre- versus
after-tax basis affects the firm’s reported tax expense. Using a proprietary dataset, he
finds that compensating business unit managers on an after-tax basis is associated with
lower firm GAAP effective tax rates. Consistent with the finding that equity risk-taking
incentives motivate managers to undertake more aggressive tax planning, Rego and
Wilson (2010) find a positive association between option vega and measures of corporate
tax aggressiveness. Dyreng et al. (2010) investigate whether specific members of the top
management team are associated with firms’ level of tax aggressiveness. Although they
conclude that top management is associated with tax planning, it is not clear whether
their results are attributable to top management’s explicit setting of the “tone at the top”
with regard to tax aggressiveness or making strategic decisions such as investment and
financing policies that are highly correlated with a firm’s tax position.
Finally, Robinson et al. (2010) attempt to measure tax manager incentives by
determining whether the tax department is viewed as a profit center (i.e., a “contributor to
the bottom line”). Although an indirect measure of managerial incentives, this is one of
the few studies to consider the incentive compensation plan of the tax manager (as
opposed to the CEO, CFO, or other senior executives). They find evidence that firms
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with tax departments that are viewed as profit centers have lower GAAP ETRs, but they
have only weak evidence that firms with tax departments that are viewed as profit centers
have lower cash ETRs.
Collectively, prior literature provides limited evidence that managerial incentives
influence tax planning choices. However, there is no evidence related to the precise
incentives of the tax director, who is the person most directly involved in the tax
decisions of the firm. Thus, our subsequent empirical analysis focuses primarily on the
compensation and incentives of the tax director and the impact of these incentives on
firms’ various tax attributes. However, we are careful to control for the incentives of
other high level executives who might also be expected to play a role in the firm’s tax
planning, which allows us to isolate the unique effect of the tax director on the firm’s
various tax attributes.
3.2. Book-tax gap
Treasury (1999), Desai (2003), and Boynton et al. (2005) all document the growth
of the spread between aggregate financial statement income and aggregate taxable
income as reported by the IRS (“the book-tax gap”).8 Book income in excess of taxable
income is consistent with manipulation of earnings reported to the capital markets, tax
aggressiveness, or some combination of these two activities.9 The discretion available in
GAAP provides managers with an opportunity to manage book earnings upward without
necessarily affecting taxable income (e.g., Badertscher et al., 2009). Similarly, Mills
(1998) and Desai (2003) suggest that the expanding book-tax gap appears to be consistent
8

Graham, Raedy and Shackelford (2010) use financial statement data to estimate the BTG from 1993 to
2008 and find that book income has exceeded estimated taxable income in all years except 2001 and 2008
(i.e., years with excessive losses).
9
Seidman (2010) conjectures that the growing book-tax gap could also be due to changes in accounting
methods over time.
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with aggressive tax planning. Phillips et al. (2003), Hanlon (2005), and Ayers et al.
(2006) provide evidence that the divide between tax and financial reporting is partially
attributable to earnings management. Finally, Frank et al. (2009) find evidence
suggesting that firms that manage earnings also aggressively manage taxes.
Prior literature has not reached a consensus about the source of the increase in the
book-tax gap.10 For the purposes of our study, examining the link between executive
incentives and the book-tax gap can provide new insights into whether firms appear to
compensate managers in general, and tax directors in particular, in a manner that
potentially induces a wider book-tax gap.

4. Sample
Our sample is derived from the proprietary data files provided to us by a large
human resources consulting firm. The data covers the fiscal years from 2002 to 2006 and
is obtained by a detailed annual survey by the consulting firm. The proprietary data
provides information on the major components of executive compensation for many
executive positions, including the tax director. We retain all public firms for which there
is complete compensation data for CEO, CFO, general counsel, and tax director, and
where we can estimate all of the tax attributes and control variables. Our final sample
consists of 423 unique firms and 1,162 firm-year observations that are nearly uniformly
10

There continue to be many unanswered questions about the book-tax gap. It is frequently argued that tax
aggressiveness must have increased over the mid- to late-1990s, as reported corporate profits surged more
than did reported taxable income. However, it is unclear why firms would begin to seek to lower their tax
burden more during this period rather than during others. What changed during this time period? While the
sophistication of capital markets has increased over time, yielding new sheltering opportunities, the extent
of the increase in the book-tax gap seems to far exceed documented examples of product sheltering (see
Graham and Tucker, 2006, and Wilson, 2009). Furthermore, many new sheltering products were created
because Treasury had eliminated an original transaction (e.g., the elimination of “Boss” led to the creation
of “Son of Boss”).
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distributed across the sample period (244, 239, 222, 234, and 223 observations from 2002
to 2006, respectively).
The industry composition of the sample relative to all firms on Compustat for the
same sample period (i.e., 2002 to 2006) is provided in Table 1, Panel A. Relative to the
full Compustat sample, our sample of firm years includes a greater proportion of firms
from Food, Textiles, and Chemicals and a somewhat smaller proportion of firms from
Financial Services, but is otherwise very similar. In Panel B of Table 1, we report the
representation of our sample in both the population of Compustat and the S&P 500.
Across all years, our sample represents approximately 30% of total assets and 33% of the
total cash paid for taxes of firms in Compustat. In addition, although our sample includes
roughly 50% of the firms in the S&P 500, it includes 65% of the total assets and 60% of
the total cash paid for taxes. Thus, our sample captures a large fraction of the economic
activity (and taxes paid) in the U.S. economy as a whole and S&P 500 in particular.
Descriptive statistics for our sample are reported in Table 2. The mean (median)
revenue and market capitalization for our sample is $17,817 ($8,211) million and
$23,555 ($9,173) million, respectively. Our sample firms are profitable, reporting both
mean and median return on assets of approximately 5%. Consistent with other
compensation and tax planning studies, our sample firms are highly levered, with a mean
(median) debt-to-assets ratio of 20% (18%). Finally, our sample firms report mean
taxable income of $1,270 billion on pre-tax income of $1,838 million. Thus, our sample
is composed of very large firms that (as we will see in Section 5) have sizeable tax
burdens and, therefore, a relatively greater proclivity to engage a tax director for tax
planning.
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5. Variable Measurement and Methodological Approach
5.1. Executive incentives
We have detailed data about the annual salary, annual bonus, annual restricted
stock and option grants, and expected payouts from long-term incentive plans (e.g., stock
options, restricted stock, performance units, and performance shares) for each executive
in our sample. We use this information to calculate two complementary measures of
incentive compensation. Our first measure is the total value of annual executive
compensation, which is computed as the sum of all of the components of compensation,
where restricted stock is valued using the market value at the date of the grant and stock
options are valued using the Black-Scholes risk-neutral value.11 This approach provides
one measure of an agent’s incentives, since total annual flow compensation should vary
with performance measures that are used in the compensation contract (Lambert and
Larcker, 1987). Our second measure is compensation mix, which is defined the ratio of
variable compensation (i.e., bonus, stock options, restricted stock, performance units, and
performance shares) to total compensation.12 Compensation mix is a measure of variable
remuneration, or how much an executive shares in the actual performance of the firm.
Compensation mix is commonly used in consulting practice as a measure of managerial
11

The parameters of the Black-Scholes formula are calculated as follows. Annualized volatility is
calculated using continuously compounded monthly returns over the prior 36 months (with a minimum of
12 months of returns). The risk-free rate is calculated using the interpolated interest rate on a Treasury
Note, with the same maturity (to the closest month) as the remaining life of the option, multiplied by 0.7 to
account for the prevalence of early exercise. Dividend yield is calculated as the dividends paid over the past
12 months scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the month. This is essentially the same method
described by Core and Guay (2002).
12
We also disaggregate this ratio into bonus mix and equity mix, defined as the ratio of the annual bonus to
total compensation and the ratio of the value of the current year’s stock and option grants to total
compensation, respectively. For the sake of brevity, we do not report results from using these variables
instead of compensation mix, but we find that they are generally similar to those with compensation mix
which suggests that the incentives are not uniquely attributable to either the bonus or equity grants.
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incentives and is similar to the measure used in prior studies such as Ittner et al. (2003)
and Erickson et al. (2006).13,14
Descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 reveal that the mean (median) total level
compensation ranges from $13,662,000 ($9,839,090) for the CEO to $787,727
($558,714) for the tax director. The high level of CEO compensation is expected, since
our sample generally consists of very large firms. In terms of compensation mix, the
mean (median) for the CEO is 0.85 (0.90) and 0.59 (0.63) for the tax director. The tax
director compensation mix is primarily attributable to equity (45% = 59% less 14% of
bonus) and suggests that the tax director’s duties extend beyond compliance. If the tax
director’s work were simply compliance, which is readily observable, there should be
little difficulty (and, hence, less need to use incentive-based compensation) in
ascertaining whether compliance tasks were performed adequately.
5.2. Effective tax rates
We begin by examining the GAAP and Cash effective tax rates. The GAAP
effective tax rate is the ratio of total tax expense to pre-tax book income (TXT/PI). It is
composed of a current and deferred component. Although the current tax expense is an

13

The incentives literature also uses the equity portfolio delta (e.g., Core and Guay, 1999) as a measure of
executive incentives. This measure captures the change in the risk-neutral value of an executive’s firmspecific equity portfolio holdings for a 1% change in the price of the underlying stock. One limitation of
our data set is that it does not provide information about the firm-specific equity holdings of the executives,
and we are therefore precluded from calculating the equity portfolio delta for either the tax director or the
other executives. We suspect that the equity ownership by the tax director is modest and, thus, that
analyzing the current year’s compensation and compensation mix will be a reasonable proxy of managerial
incentives. In addition, because we have information about the equity portfolio holdings of the CEO and
CEO, we repeat all of our tabulated analyses using equity portfolio delta as the measure of the incentives of
these two executives and we find that our primary results are essentially unchanged.
14
An alternative approach is to adopt a two-stage research design in which we first regress either the
executive’s total compensation or variable compensation mix on the economic determinants of incentive
compensation, and then use the residual from this regression in a second-stage model of the various tax
attributes of interest (BTG, GAAP and Cash ETR, etc.). The use of this alternative measure produces results
that are substantively equivalent to those reported in the tables.
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estimate of the current taxes owed to the tax authorities, it does not include the tax benefit
from stock options until the post-FAS123R period. Deferred tax expense captures the tax
implications of differences between book and tax accrual accounting. Consistent with
other studies (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2008), Table 2 reports that mean (median) GAAP ETR is
about 30% (31%). A GAAP effective tax rate lower than the statutory tax rates implies
that firms have income included in book income that will never be recorded in taxable
income (e.g., municipal bond interest and permanently reinvested earnings).15
We model the ETR as a function of both economic variables that have been suggested
by prior literature (see below) and the incentives of the firm’s key executives. We specify
the model as follows.
ETRi,t = β0 + β1Incentivesi,t + β2Return-onAssetsi,t + β3Std Dev.ROAi,t + β4Log(Market Cap)i,t
+ β5Leveragei,t + β6Change in Goodwilli,t + β7NewInvestmenti,t + β8Foreign Assetsi,t
+ β9GeographicComplexityi,t + β10IndustryComplexityi,t + β11Proportion Tax Fees
i,t

+ β12TaxFeesi,t + YearIndicators + IndustryIndicators + εi,t

(1)

where ETR is either the GAAP or Cash effective tax rate. The Cash ETR measures the
current cash outflows for income taxes as a percentage of pre-tax book income ((TXPD +
(TXBCO + TXBCOF)) / PI).16 Unlike the GAAP ETR, the Cash ETR reflects deferral of
cash tax payments. Table 2 reveals that the mean (median) Cash ETR is 29% (23%),
15

Note that ETR differentials, such as tax credits, also drive down the effective tax rate as they effectively
represent a difference of (1-τ)/τ between book and taxable income.
16
Unlike Dyreng et al. (2008), our measure of the cash effective tax rate considers the impact of stock
options and special items. First, we view the cash benefit of stock options as a de facto cash payment for
income taxes. Note that the tax benefit of options reduces the cash outflow for income taxes without any
corresponding adjustment to book income. Hence, in the pre-SFAS 123R period, a firm that chooses to
compensate employees with equity rather than cash will report a lower Cash ETR, not because the firm has
a lower cash payment for taxes but because its book income does not include any compensation expense.
The expensing of stock options under FAS 123R alleviates much this measurement error, but since our
sample spans SFAS 123R adoption, it is critical for us to account for this issue. Second, Dyreng et al.’s
exclusion of special items from the denominator leads to downwardly biased estimates of the cash effective
tax rates as 73% of the special items reported in Compustat between 2002 and 2006 are income decreasing.
In Table 2, we also report descriptive statistics on Cash ETR w/o option benefit, which excludes the tax
benefit from stock options in the numerator. The mean and median values of this measure of the cash
effective tax rate are slightly lower than the mean and median values of Cash ETR.
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which suggests that our sample has accruals that increase pre-tax book income but not
taxable income. Note that both the GAAP and Cash ETRs are censored to fall between
zero and one.17 Incentives are the incentives of the CEO, tax director, general counsel,
and CFO, respectively, measured as either total annual compensation or compensation
mix (described in Section 5.1). In addition, all independent variables are winsorized at the
1% level to ameliorate the effect of influential observations on the results. Since both
dependent variables are bound in the (closed) interval [0,1], we estimate the models using
a doubly censored Tobit specification to eliminate bias that would otherwise result from
OLS estimation.18 Finally, since prior studies have documented substantial variation in
ETRs across industries and over time, we include year and industry indicator variables to
capture the average effect of this variation.
5.2.1. Economic controls
We include Return on Assets (net income over beginning total assets) to control
for the underlying economic activity of the firm. We include the standard deviation of the
previous five years’ ROA (Std Dev. ROA) to capture variability in the firm’s operations.
Next we include a size proxy, the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization
(Log(Market Cap)). Prior studies’ evidence on the relationship between GAAP ETR and
firm size is mixed. For example, Rego (2003), Zimmerman (1983), and Omer et al.
(1993) document a negative relationship between firm size and GAAP ETR, a finding that
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The fraction of GAAP (Cash) ETRs that are truncated at zero and one are 6.9% (6.7%) and 1.2% (2.7%),
respectively. Since these two variables are censored both below and above, we used a doubly censored
Tobit in our analysis of the ETRs.
18
All tabulated specifications were also estimated using ordinary least squares and produced almost
identical results, which is not surprising given the relatively low fraction of observations that are censored
at either end of the [0,1] interval. It can be shown that OLS estimates will be identical to those from a
doubly censored Tobit when there are no censored observations. In addition, we report tabulated results
from OLS estimation, since doing so facilitates the interpretation of the marginal effects of the coefficient
estimates.
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is consistent with the “political cost” hypothesis. However, Jacob (1996), Gupta and
Newberry (1997), and Mills et al. (1998) do not find a statistically significant
relationship. We therefore include firm size but do not predict the sign of the relationship.
Leverage, defined as the ratio of the firm’s long-term debt to total assets (LT/AT), is
included to capture the extent of the tax shield of debt. Ceteris paribus, the greater the
firm’s tax shield of debt, the lower the need for incremental tax planning (see MackieMason, 1990). Change in Goodwill, defined as the annual increase in the firm’s goodwill
scaled by beginning total assets (∆GDWL/Beginning AT), is included to capture merger
and acquisition activity of the firm during the year. If goodwill decreases, then Change in
Goodwill is set to zero. New Investment, defined in Richardson (2006) as the sum of
research and development expense, capital expenditures, and acquisitions less the sum of
sales of property and depreciation all scaled by total assets ((XRD + CAPX + ACQ –
SPPE – DPC) / Avg. AT), is included to control for the firm’s investment activity, since
investment often leads to book-tax differences because the tax and accounting rules are
different (e.g., the investment tax credit, accelerated depreciation methods, and bonus
depreciation).19
Rego (2003) finds that multinational firms with more extensive foreign operations
have lower worldwide GAAP ETRs, a finding that she interprets as being consistent with
economies of scale in tax planning. We therefore include the foreign assets of the
company to control for differences in international planning opportunities. Foreign Assets
are estimated using the methodology described in Oler et al. (2007), which uses the
consolidated turnover ratio and foreign segment sales to infer foreign assets. We include

19

Notice that New Investment captures cash-based M&A activity, whereas the Change in Goodwill
captures taxable and non-taxable M&A activity.
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an estimate of the firm’s foreign asset base to capture differential tax rates that typically
apply to firms’ foreign activities.
Finally, since more complex organizations require more executive talent (which
commands higher pay) and more opportunity to tax plan, we include two measures of the
complexity of the organization: Geographic Complexity and Industry Complexity.
Following Bushman et al. (2004), these measures are revenue-based HirfindahlHirschman indices that capture the within-firm geographic and industry segment
concentration of the firm. Lower values of these measures suggest a relatively more
complex organization, so we predict a negative association between these measures of
complexity and the ETR consistent with more opportunity for tax planning.
5.2.2. External tax planning
Firms may choose to use external providers for tax planning, which might weaken
the link between tax director incentive compensation and measures of tax planning. We
include two proxies for the extent of a firm’s use of tax consulting services. Tax Fees is
the total tax fees paid to a firm’s external auditor scaled by total assets as reported by
Audit Analytics.20 The greater a firm’s tax fees are relative to its size, the more likely the
firm has contracted with its auditor for tax planning purposes. Proportion Tax Fees is that
ratio of tax fees to total fees paid to the external auditor. The greater this ratio, the more
emphasis a firm places on tax planning and reporting. Measures of external tax services
could either be positively or negatively associated with measures of tax planning. If a
firm faces a relatively high tax burden, then external tax consultants could be engaged to
help the tax director. On the other hand, the firm may have a relatively low tax burden

20

Note that to the extent the firm utilizes non-auditor tax consulting services, our Tax Fees measure will
underestimate the extent to which the firm obtains outside tax assistance.
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because external tax consultants were engaged. Hence, we make no prediction on the
direction of the association with measures of tax planning.
5.3. Book-tax gap
The next tax attribute we examine is the book-tax gap (BTG) because, assuming
the BTG reflects tax planning, we can use the BTG and its components to investigate both
conforming and non-conforming tax planning. If, after controlling for firm performance,
the tax director’s compensation is associated with a smaller book-tax gap, then we can
infer that the tax director is compensated for managing taxable income in a manner that
avoids the scrutiny of the tax authorities (Mills 1998). On the other hand, as firms face
taxes in multiple jurisdictions, we conjecture that the BTG may better capture “tax
planning” by measuring activity that reduces pre-tax income.21 If tax directors have
incentives to reduce taxable income even at the expense of reducing book income (i.e.,
conforming tax planning), then we should observe either a negative or no association
with the BTG and a negative association with both taxable income and pre-tax book
income. On the other hand, non-conforming tax planning may manifest in a positive
association between the incentive compensation of the tax director and the BTG.
We model the book-tax gap as a function of both economic variables that have
been suggested by prior literature and the incentives of the firm’s key executives. We
specify the model as follows.
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For example, consider two firms, A and B, that both have a foreign affiliate that generates 50% of the
consolidated entity’s income (with the other 50% generated by the domestic parent). Suppose the tax rate in
A’s affiliate is 40% and the rate in B’s affiliate is 20%. Further suppose that firm A’s tax director shelters
20% of its affiliate’s income. However, B’s tax director shelters only 10% of its affiliate’s income. It is
unclear which firm has the “better” tax director. On an after-tax basis, Firm B has a lower GAAP ETR
(assuming PRE designation under APB 23) and Cash ETR. Yet Firm A’s tax director has generated a
“larger” book tax difference. This is the reason we consider the BTG tests as capturing “pre-tax” tax
planning.
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BTGi,t = β0 + β1Incentives i,t + β2 Operating Cash Flow i,t + β3Std Dev. ROAi,t +
β4log(Market Capi,t) + β5Leveragei,t + β6Change in Goodwilli,t + β7New
Investmenti,t + β8ForeignAssetsi,t + β9Geographic Complexityi,t + β10Industry
Complexityi,t + β11Proportion Tax Fees i,t + β12TaxFeesi,t + Year Indicators +
(2)

Industry Indicators + εi,t

where BTG is the book-tax gap measured globally and scaled by total assets at the
beginning of the period. The BTG is measured as the difference between pre-tax income
less income attributable to minority interest (Compustat PI – MII) and taxable income
(defined as current federal tax expense (TXFED) grossed up by the maximum federal
statutory tax rate (i.e., 35%) plus pre-tax foreign income (PIFO) less the annual change in
NOLs (NOL)) scaled (by total assets).22 Incentives are the incentives of the CEO, tax
director, general counsel and CFO, respectively, measured as either the level of
compensation or compensation mix. Similar to equation (1), it is necessary to specify the
appropriate control variables for the BTG. We rely on the same controls as those included
in equation (1) except that we replace Return on Assets, which is effectively a component
of our measure of the BTG, with Cash Flow From Operations scaled by average assets to
control for the underlying economic activity of the firm. All of the remaining variables
are as defined above.
5.3.1 Components of the book-tax gap
22

We adjust for the minority interest on the assumption that it represents a greater than 20% ownership
stake by the minority. We continue to find similar results if we do not remove the minority interest. In
addition, we estimate foreign taxable income by using reported pretax income, which implicitly assumes a
relatively high level of book-tax conformity on foreign jurisdictions. Most studies estimate taxable income
by grossing up current foreign tax expense by the top U.S. statutory rate, which biases taxable income
(BTG) downward (upward) since foreign statutory tax rates are typically lower than U.S. rates. Finally, we
ignore the tax benefit of stock options (TXBCO + TXBCOF) in our estimate of the BTG because the
benefit of options was a known difference between book and taxable income during the majority of our
sample period. The tax benefit of options, however, is considered in our measures of taxable income in
later analyses. We presume that employee stock option exercise activity is exogenous to tax planning
(barring extreme instances such as the one described in Matsunaga, Shevlin, and Shores, 1992). Ideally, in
our BTG analysis, we would eliminate all differences between book income and tax income unrelated to tax
planning.
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Table 2 shows that the mean book-tax gap is 5.0% of total assets for our sample.23
The positive value indicates that book income is greater than taxable income. Although
the book-tax gap is an important tax construct, there are both economic and econometric
reasons why the book-tax gap might be problematic as a dependent variable. The booktax gap is measured as the difference between pre-tax book income and estimated taxable
income, and each of its two components might exhibit a different relationship with the
independent variables included in equation (1). From an economic perspective, the booktax gap itself might not be the construct of interest because some executives influence the
measure indirectly (e.g., the CEO's setting of the firm’s investment policy) and others
directly (e.g., the smoothing earnings by the CFO). Since we are specifically interested in
the direct links between tax planning and managerial incentives, we disaggregate the
book-tax gap into its two components and jointly estimate both equations using
seemingly unrelated regression (Zellner, 1962). Joint estimation of the two resulting
equations also allows us to formally compare coefficients across the two equations.
Disaggregating the book-tax gap into its components also allows us to investigate
whether there is evidence of conforming tax planning. When a firm undertakes
conforming tax planning, book income will be reduced because the firm seeks to lower
taxable income. Since large book-tax differences may draw the attention of the tax
authorities, firms may be willing to undertake conforming tax planning because it
increases the likelihood that the firm will prevail under audit (Mills, 1998; Cloyd, Pratt,
and Stock, 1996).
5.4. Specific measures of “tax aggressiveness”
23

Untabulated analysis reveals that the mean BTG for our sample is positive for all years during our sample
period. We also find that the mean BTG is positive for the firms in the S&P500 during each year of our
sample period.
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The final tax attribute that we examine is tax aggressiveness. As discussed above,
there is no generally accepted definition of this construct, and it is thus difficult to
measure. Nevertheless, we investigate two recently developed measures of tax
aggressiveness: Frank et al.’s (2009) DTAX and Wilson’s (2009) SHELTER. Frank et al.
(2009 p. 468) define “aggressive tax reporting” as “a downward manipulation of taxable
income through tax planning that may or may not be considered fraudulent tax evasion.”
Anecdotal evidence suggests that for public companies, the ideal tax planning
transactions are those that create permanent differences.24 By creating permanent
differences, the firm reduces cash taxes paid without decreasing financial statement
income.
To investigate whether incentives are associated with permanent differences and
ETR differentials (hereafter “perm diffs” for expositional simplicity), we begin by
computing a modified version of Frank et al.’s (2009) DTAX measure of discretionary
perm diffs. Frank et al. (2009) compute DTAX as the residuals from a regression of an
estimate of perm diffs on measures of intangible assets, income of unconsolidated
subsidiaries, minority interest, state tax burdens, changes in NOLs, and lagged perm
diffs. We modify this computation by including Oler et al.’s (2007) measure of foreign
assets (Foreign Assets) to control for the existence of multinational operations. By
including Foreign Assets in the first stage, we attempt to control for ETR differentials
that result from “ordinary” overseas operations. Without this modification, DTAX would

24

The 1999 Treasury White Paper on corporate tax shelters noted the following: “There is a current trend
among public companies to treat corporate in-house tax departments as profit centers that strive to keep the
corporation’s effective tax rate low and in line with that of competitors. Accordingly, in most recent
corporate tax shelters involving public companies, the financial accounting treatment of the shelter item has
been inconsistent with the claimed federal income tax treatment.” See McGill and Outslay (2004) for
further discussion of the prevalence of permanent difference creation in tax shelter arrangements.
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suggest that firms with extensive foreign operations or foreign operations in low tax
jurisdictions are always more aggressive tax planners.25 Table 2 reports that the mean
(median) DTAX is 7.5% (0.30%) of total assets. Positive levels of DTAX indicate that our
sample firms have discretionary perm diffs that reduce taxable income relative to the
population of Compustat firms that are used to estimate DTAX.
We investigate whether executives have incentives to engage in creating
permanent differences by estimating the following model:
DTAXi,t = γ0 + γ1Incentivesi,t + γ2Return-on-Assetsi,t + γ3Std Dev. ROAi,t + γ4log(Market
Capi,t)+ γ5Leveragei,t + γ6Change in Goodwilli + γ7NewInvestmenti,t + γ8Foreign
Assetsi,t + γ9 GeographicComplexityi,t + γ 10IndustryComplexityi,t +
γ11Proportion Tax Fees i,t + γ 12TaxFeesi,t + νi,t

(3)

where the variables are as defined above.
Finally, we investigate whether tax director incentives are associated with the
predicted presence of tax shelters. We estimate Wilson’s (2009) SHELTER measure
which was developed using a sample of approximately 60 firms identified in court
documents as having participated in illegal tax shelters. We use the following model to
determine whether tax director incentives are associated with a high probability of
sheltering behavior.
SHELTERi,t = γ0 + γ1Incentivesi,t + γ2Return-on-Assetsi,t + γ3Std Dev. ROAi,t
+ γ4log(Market Capi,t)+ γ5Leveragei,t + γ6Change in Goodwilli
+ γ7NewInvestmenti,t + γ8Foreign Assetsi,t + γ9 GeographicComplexityi,t +
γ10IndustryComplexityi,t + γ11Proportion Tax Fees i,t + γ 12TaxFeesi,t + νi,t
25

(4)

Note that Frank et al.’s measure, DTAX, implicitly assumes that any variation in perm diffs that does not
result from the “known” sources of perm diffs included in the first stage (i.e., change in NOL, minority
interest income, state income taxes, intangibles, and unconsolidated subsidiaries) are the result of tax
planning. We conjecture that foreign operations are another source of perm diffs that are not necessarily
discretionary tax planning and are therefore not necessarily indicative of aggressive behavior. Accordingly,
we modify Frank et al.’s DTAX measure by also including foreign assets in the first-stage regression.
Nevertheless, all of our reported results are robust to excluding foreign assets and measuring DTAX
exactly as described by Frank et al.
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6. Results
6.1. GAAP ETR
The results of estimating equation (1) where the GAAP ETR is the dependent
variable are presented in Table 3. We first consider the role of the level of compensation,
which is presented in columns (1) and (2). In the first model, where all of the positions
are simultaneously considered, we find a strong negative relationship between tax
director compensation and the GAAP ETR, but no significant relationship with the other
three executives. This strong negative relationship continues to hold when we estimate
the model considering only the tax executive.26
When we measure incentives as compensation mix in columns (3) and (4), we
again find a strong negative relationship between tax director incentives and the GAAP
ETR when all executives are considered together. We continue to find a negative
relationship when only the tax director’s incentives are included in the analysis (i.e.
column 4). Overall, the evidence presented in Table 3 provides strong support for the
notion that tax directors, but not the CEO, general counsel, and CFO have incentives to
manage the GAAP ETR.
We also find a significant relationship between the GAAP ETR and certain control
variables included in the specification. In particular, Return on Assets is significantly
positive which indicates that more profitable firms have higher GAAP ETRs. Our proxy
for the operating risk, Std. Dev. ROA, is negative and significant, consistent with
convexity in the tax function (i.e., losses can reduce future earnings). Foreign Assets is
positive and is generally significant, suggesting that firms with greater multinational
26

When we include the incentives of each of the other executives (CEO, CFO, GC) alone in the model,
they are never significant.
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activities have higher GAAP ETRs. Although we expected foreign activity to give rise to
lower tax liabilities, our results are consistent with foreign investment being correlated
with future profitability. Geographical Complexity is positive and significant, suggesting
that firms with more dispersed geographic operations have lower effective tax rates.
Consistent with Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998), we also we find that a higher
ProportionTaxFees is associated relatively lower GAAP ETRs, which is consistent with
the presence of more sophisticated tax planning.
Interestingly, these results suggest that tax directors are compensated on the basis
of after-tax financial reporting measures rather than pre-tax measures. In particular, since
we find no association between taxable income and tax director incentives, the negative
relationship with the GAAP ETR is consistent with tax directors’ undertaking of tax
planning involving permanent differences and ETR differentials. Thus, our results
corroborate Robinson et al.’s (2010) finding that firms provide incentives to the tax
department to mitigate the impact of taxes on bottom-line net income.
6.2. Cash ETR
The results of estimating equation (1) with the Cash ETR are presented in Table 3,
columns (5) through (8), and parallel our analysis of the GAAP ETR. When we consider
the level of compensation as the measure of incentives in columns (5) and (6), we fail to
find a significant relationship between the incentives of any of the executives and the
Cash ETR. When compensation mix is used as the measure of incentives in columns (7)
and (8), we again find no relationship between executive incentives and the Cash ETR in
any of the specifications.27

27

When we use the leading three-year average Cash ETR, Cash ETR (3 year), as the dependent variables,
we find no association with our various measures of incentives. Note that this analysis reduces our sample
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We document several significant relationships between the cash effective tax rate
and the control variables. Return on Assets is significantly positive which indicates that
more profitable firms have higher cash effective tax rates. Std ROA is negative and
significant, consistent with the finding that a greater variation in a firm’s earnings results
in a lower Cash ETR because of the convexity in the statutory rate structure. Change in
Goodwill is positively related to the Cash ETR, a finding that suggests that M&A activity
leads to lower pre-tax book income with no corresponding reduction to cash taxes paid
(e.g., in-process R&D). Finally, we find that, consistent with the presence of incremental
tax incentives, New Investment exhibits a negative and significant relationship with Cash
ETR.
Overall, the lack of a relationship between tax director incentives and Cash ETR
is in sharp contrast to the strong negative relationship for the GAAP ETR presented in
Table 3.28 Collectively, these results suggest that tax directors have incentives to reduce
the GAAP ETR. One agency-theoretic explanation for this result is that the contracting
weight on a performance measure is a function of its signal-to-noise ratio (Holmstrom,
1979; Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Banker and Datar, 1989; Lambert, 2001).
Accordingly, an increase in either the sensitivity of the performance measure to the
agent’s actions (i.e., the strength of the signal about the agent’s actions), or a decrease in
its conditional variance (i.e., the noise with which it reflects the agent’s actions) will,
ceteris paribus, increase the relative weight placed on the performance measure in the
to 772 firm years, since we are unable to estimate Cash ETR (3 year) for 2006. The negative association
between GAAP ETR and tax director incentives continues to hold in this reduced sample.
28
To alleviate concerns that our GAAP ETR results are driven solely by tax accounting accruals, we have
collected data on firms’ valuation allowance and cushion activity for a random subsample of our firms.
When we include the change in the valuation allowance and/or cushion, we continue to find a significant
negative (no) association between the tax director’s compensation (both levels and mix) and the GAAP
(Cash) ETR.
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optimal compensation contract. From a “signal” perspective, the GAAP ETR is likely to
be more sensitive to the tax director’s actions than the Cash ETR is, because, unlike the
Cash ETR, it contains an accrual component that estimates the future effects of actions in
the current period.29 From a “noise” perspective, the Cash ETR of our sample firms
exhibits more variation than does the GAAP ETR (Table 2 reports that the standard
deviation of Cash (GAAP) ETR is 26.2% (14.8%)). This is likely attributable to the
discrete nature of items such as option exercises and tax audit cash outflows, which is
undesirable from a contracting perspective.30 Thus, our results are consistent with the
GAAP ETR being a more informative measure of the tax director’s actions, and,
accordingly, it is allocated more weight in the incentive compensation contract.
Our results could also be construed as consistent with firms potentially forgoing
cash savings to gain financial reporting benefits (e.g., Engel et al., 1999; Erickson et al.,
2004). Finally, our results also corroborate Robinson et al.’s (2010) finding of little to no
association between the profit center motive of the firm’s tax department and Cash ETR.
6.3. Book-tax gap and its components
The results of the book-tax gap analysis are presented in Table 4. We find no
relationship between the book-tax gap and either the level of compensation or the
compensation mix of any of the executives. In addition, we find no relationship between
the incentives of the tax director and either the PBI or TI component of the BTG.
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In a multiperiod contracting setting, a number of authors such as Dutta and Reichelstein (2003) show that
accruals are valuable for contracting because they provide a current (albeit noisy) estimate of the future
cash flows generated by the agent’s actions in the current period. Accordingly, accruals are useful for
overcoming agency problems that result from differences in discount rates between the principal and agent.
30
This idea is a manifestation of the controllability principal from agency theory. Lambert (2001, p. 23)
defines a performance measure as “controllable” if “the agent’s actions influence the probability
distribution of that variable.” To the extent that a performance measure that is not controllable by the agent
is used in the compensation contract, it imposes additional risk on the agent for which he or she must be
compensated.

28

In terms of the control variables, the positive association between BTG and
Operating Cash Flow suggests that more profitable firms have a greater wedge between
book and taxable income. When the dependent variable is pre-tax book (taxable) income,
in all models, the estimated coefficient on cash flows of approximately 0.84 (0.59)
indicates that pre-tax book (taxable) income is, on average, roughly 16% (41%) lower
than cash flows from operations. The positive relationship between log(Market
Capitalization) and measures of firm performance (PBI and TI) is consistent with
profitable firms being more valuable. In addition, the negative association between
Industry Complexity and the BTG suggests that firms with more variation in industry
composition have greater book-tax gaps. However, consistent with earnings management,
the association appears to stem from the fact that these firms have relatively higher pretax book income.
Overall, the results of the taxable income specification support the notion that
there is little cross-sectional variation in the executives’ incentives to reduce taxable
income, at least as we can estimate this measure. As our sample is composed of large
public firms, it is likely that these firms are averse to tax planning opportunities that
reduce both book and tax income.
6.4. Measures of “tax aggressiveness”
Our final set of results relates to tax aggressiveness and is presented in Table 5.
Using the level of compensation as our measure of incentives, we find no relationship
between executive incentives and Frank et al.’s (2009) measure of discretionary
permanent differences/ETR differentials. We also fail to find a correlation between any
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of the measures of executive incentives and Wilson’s (2009) measure of sheltering
behavior (SHELTER).31
We document several significant relationships between the measures of tax
aggressiveness and the control variables. Interestingly, we find that DTAX is positively
associated with Change in Goodwill, a finding that is consistent with increases in
permanent differences around M&A activity. The negative association between DTAX
and New Investment suggests that firms with relatively more new depreciation deductions
have smaller discretionary permanent differences. Finally, Proportion Tax Fees is
significantly positively related to DTAX, a finding that suggests that hiring the firm’s
auditor for tax services complements “aggressive” tax planning.
Return on Assets exhibits a positive and significant relationship with SHELTER
which indicates that more profitable firms have greater predicted probability of
participating in tax shelters. We also find that SHELTER is positively related to the size
of the firm which is consistent with the large fixed costs of entering into shelter
transactions. The negative association between geographic complexity and SHELTER
suggests that firms with more foreign affiliates have a higher probability of being
involved in a tax shelter. However, overall, we find little evidence that the either the
CEO, tax director, general counsel, or CFO are provided incentives to undertake
aggressive tax planning as measured by DTAX and SHELTER.32

31

We obtain similar results when we use Compensation Mix as our measure of incentives. We also obtain
similar results when we include the five variables from the first-stage DTAX specification that are not
included in equation (3), namely, the ratio of (i) intangible assets to total assets, (ii) earnings of
subsidiaries, (iii) minority interest income, (iv) state taxes, and (v) change in NOL.
32
Note that there are limitations of the DTAX and SHELTER measures. First, DTAX measures only
incremental permanent differences and ETR differentials (“perm diffs”), so, ceteris paribus, a tax director
that has replaced one perm diff with another (perhaps because of a change in the tax law) will have zero
DTAX. Second, much of the variation in DTAX could stem from changes in foreign operations. Although
we include foreign assets in our model of DTAX, we still are not able to control for the tax rates of the
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7. Sensitivity Analyses
7.1. Governance characteristics
Prior literature such as Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) has shown that
various governance characteristics are related to firms’ incentive compensation practices.
In addition, recent research such as Desai and Dharmapala (2006) suggests a link
between firms’ governance characteristics and the extent to which they engage in
aggressive tax planning.33 We therefore repeat the analyses above, including a broad
array of governance variables that have been used in prior research. In particular, prior
studies linking corporate governance to compensation practices have examined three
broad categories of governance constructs: (i) board of director characteristics; (ii) Board
structure; and (iii) state antitakeover laws. We obtain board of director data from the
Equilar analysis of proxy statements and use six variables to capture board
characteristics: (i) the number of directors, (ii) the fraction of inside directors, (iii) the
fraction of directors who are over 69 years old, (iv) the fraction of the board that is
“busy” (which is measured as serving on at least two additional boards), (v) an indicator
that equals one if the lead director is classified as affiliated, and zero otherwise, and (vi)
the fraction of directors classified as outsiders who were appointed after the current
CEO’s term began.

jurisdictions where the assets are located. Third, variation in DTAX could be attributable to changes in the
tax contingency that is related to past tax planning instead of current tax planning. Regarding SHELTER,
the majority of the variation in the measure results from firm size. Since our sample consists almost entirely
of large firms, there is almost no variation in this measure within our sample (Table 2 reports that the
interquartile range is from 0.946 to 0.994). Since our tests are cross-sectional, the lack of variation in these
measures across our sample suggests that this measure produces a low-powered test.
33
In particular, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that “good governance” increases the link between
equity compensation and aggressive tax planning.
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Next, we use data from FactSet SharkRepellent to measure board structure similar
to Gompers et al. (2003), Daines and Klausner (2001), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), and
Faleye (2007). First, we include a set of indicator variables to capture whether the
company’s board members are elected annually or are elected to staggered, multiyear
terms.34 We also include an indicator for whether the firm has multiple classes of shares
with unequal voting rights.
Finally, similar to Bebchuk et al. (2002), Cheng et al. (2004), and Wahal et al.
(1995), we include variables for state antitakeover laws. Their results suggest that the
introduction of stronger antitakeover legislation leads to greater managerial
entrenchment. Our results (untabulated) are robust to the inclusion of governance metrics.
Specifically, we continue to find a significant negative relationship between tax director
incentives and the GAAP ETR and no relationship between tax director incentives and
BTG, Cash ETR, DTAX, and SHELTER.
7.2. Reversing the regression
Prior studies that investigate cross-sectional variation in firms’ tax planning
model executive compensation as a function of the firm’s tax attributes (e.g., Rego and
Wilson, 2010; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). These studies find that higher levels of
compensation are associated with a higher level of tax aggressiveness. In addition, this
specification allows researchers to simultaneously evaluate multiple measures of tax
planning. We therefore estimate regressions of both total compensation and
compensation mix of the CEO, tax director, general counsel, and CFO on a variety of
economic controls as well as GAAP ETR and Cash ETR. The results of the total

34

Activist shareholders argue that staggered terms impede shareholders’ monitoring of the Board by
making it more difficult for them to alter the board’s composition over a short time period.
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compensation regressions are reported in Table 6, and they reveal that GAAP ETR
continues to exhibit a strong negative relationship with the level of tax director
compensation.35 Interestingly, and consistent with our signal-to-noise interpretation of the
various performance measures, when we replace Cash ETR with Three-year lagged Cash
ETR, we find a negative (but insignificant) relationship with the level of CEO and tax
director compensation. This finding suggests that the signal becomes less noisy as the
window over which Cash ETR is measured lengthens.
7.3. Matched-pair research design
There are two important limitations of the traditional linear regression approach
used in the preceding tests of the relationship between executive incentives and firm tax
attributes. First, this approach relies on a linear functional form linking the outcome
variable of interest (i.e., tax attributes) with both the independent variable of interest (i.e.,
executive compensation) and the other control variables, or “covariates” (e.g., firm size,
operating performance, and tax professional fees). To the extent that this linearity
assumption is violated, the model is misspecified and can produce biased coefficient
estimates. Second, to the extent that there is endogenous matching of executives with
firms (and compensation contracts) on the basis of some unobserved characteristics (e.g.,
executive risk aversion or talent), this gives rise to traditional correlated omitted variable
problems and this will bias the parameter estimates obtained from a linear model.
To mitigate these econometric concerns, we also use a propensity score matchedpair research design (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum, 2002; Armstrong et al.,
2009), in which we form matched pairs of firm years that are similar along all of their

35

The coefficient on Cash ETR and GAAP ETR are statistically different for both the tax director (p =
0.027, two-tail) and the general counsel (p = 0.071, two-tail).
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(observable) economic characteristics, but most dissimilar in terms of their executives’
incentives.36 After matching on these variables, any difference in outcome of interest
(e.g., BTG, GAAP ETR, Cash ETR, SHELTER, and DTAX) can be more appropriately
attributed to differences in the level of the executive’s incentives rather than to
differences in the other variables, regardless of the underlying structural form. We also
assess the sensitivity of our results to unobserved correlated omitted variables by
determining the magnitude of the correlated omitted variable bias that is necessary to
cause any statistically significant differences between matched pairs to become
insignificant.37 Although this approach does not resolve the endogeneity problem per se,
the computation enables us to provide some insight into whether our results are robust to
endogenous matching.
A formal test of the difference in GAAP ETR between matched pairs is presented
in Panels A and B of Table 7, respectively. We observe that both higher levels of tax
director compensation and tax director compensation mix exhibit a strong negative
relationship with the GAAP ETR (Wilcoxon p-values of 0.0001 and 0.0275, respectively,
and t-statistic p-values of 0.0005 and 0.0266, respectively). Further, both the mean and
median differences in the GAAP ETR of -0.029 and -0.018 between the firms with a
36

Our propensity score matched-pair research design requires a model for the conditional probability of
receiving a given level or mix of compensation given observable features of the contracting environment.
Consistent with many prior studies, we assume that the choice of the level and mix of compensation are a
function of the economic and tax planning characteristics discussed in the Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. We also
required matched pairs to be from the same year and industry. The matched sample was constructed using a
nonbipartite matching algorithm suggested by Derigs (1988), which is an “optimal” algorithm in the sense
that it considers the potential distances between other pairs when forming a particular matched pair. The
matching was done without replacement.
37
An alternative way of characterizing the correlated omitted variable problem in our setting is that there is
the potential for endogenous matching (or sorting) of executives and companies. If, for example, executives
who are relatively more risk-tolerant decide to work for companies that offer more risky, incentive-based
compensation packages (because these are the executives who are better able to bear the associated risk),
any observed relationship between executive incentives and certain tax characteristics (e.g., tax
aggressiveness) could be a result of differences in executive risk-tolerance rather than differences in the
observed incentives.
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relatively high and relatively low level of tax director compensation, respectively, and 0.019 and -0.011 for tax director compensation mix, respectively, are economically
significant.
To provide a benchmark of the magnitude of our GAAP ETR results, we also
provide the propensity score matched-pair analysis for Cash ETR.38 The Cash ETR
results in Panel B show that none of the incentives variables exhibits a significant
relationship with the Cash ETR. These results are consistent with the linear regressions
results presented above and suggest that the relationship is robust to possible
misspecification of the functional form linking the incentive and control variables with
the tax outcomes.
Similar to all observational studies, our results are susceptible to “hidden bias” if
there are correlated omitted variables that are not balanced across the two categories.
Rosenbaum (2002, 2007) develops a bounding approach for assessing the sensitivity of
the matched-pair results to hidden bias.39 In untabulated sensitivity analysis, we find that
the results remain statistically significant to the existence of a correlated omitted variable
that shifts the assignment of executives to the treatment group from a 50%/50%
probability of being assigned to the high- and low-incentives categories to a

38

Note that a similar propensity score matched-pair analysis of BTG, SHELTER, and DTAX provides no
evidence that any of these tax attributes exhibits a significant relationship with executive incentive
compensation.
39
In our context, hidden bias exists if two executive (denoted i and j) have the same observed (economic
and tax planning) covariates, but different probabilities (denoted π) of having a particular level of
incentives. The odds that each executive was assigned to the high- and low-incentives category are denoted
πi/(1-πi) and πj/(1-πj), respectively. If the odds ratio (following Rosenbaum (2002), denoted by Г), does not
equal one, then the two executives have an unequal probability of being assigned to a category, and hidden
bias exists. Rosenbaum (2002) shows that relaxing the assumption that Г = 1 allows for a computation of
the amount of hidden bias (or, the strength of a correlated omitted variable) that is needed to alter any
significant inferences. Smaller values of Г indicate statistically significant results that are more sensitive to
hidden bias.
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66.5%/33.5% probability assignment.40 Thus, our results are robust to substantive
correlated omitted variables, and this provides some justification for drawing causal
inferences regarding the relationship between tax director incentives and GAAP ETRs.

8. Conclusion
Although tax directors are responsible for one of the firm’s largest outflows of
cash and one of the largest expenses on the income statement, almost nothing is known
about how these executives are compensated. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first paper to directly study the link between the incentives of tax directors and measures
of the extent of their firm’s tax planning. Overall, our analyses of the book-tax gap, its
components, the cash effective tax rate, and alternative measures of “tax aggressiveness”
provide little evidence that our sample of large, publicly traded firms explicitly
incentivize their tax function to undertake measures to lower the firm’s contemporaneous
cash tax burden. Instead, consistent with tax directors receiving incentives to reduce the
level of tax expense reported in the financial statements, we find that tax executives’
compensation is negatively associated with the GAAP ETR. An agency theoretic
interpretation of this result is that the GAAP ETR is relatively controllable by the tax
director and can be measured with sufficient precision so as to make it valuable for

40

In other words, the statistical tests conducted in Table 7 are based on the assumption that, conditional on
the variables in the propensity score model, executives have a 50% probability of being assigned to both
the treatment and control groups (i.e., the high- and low-incentives groups). If instead, because of some
correlated omitted variable (e.g., executive risk tolerance), executives with a higher observed level of
incentive compensation were actually assigned to the treatment group 66.5% of the time and assigned to the
control group only 33.5% of the time (or Г = 2), a statistically significant difference in the GAAP ETR
between the two groups would still obtain. Since no strict benchmark exists to determine whether a given Γ
is “large” or “small,” the designation is inherently subjective and depends on beliefs as to the degree of
endogenous selection on unobservable factors. Given the extensive controls included in the propensity
score matching, we believe that it is unlikely that a correlated omitted variable exists that will produce a Г
> 2.
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contracting. In contrast, the firm’s other tax attributes are either not sufficiently
controllable by the tax director and/or are too noisy to be valuable for contracting.
As with all empirical observational studies, there are several caveats regarding our
results. First, our sample consists primarily of large profitable U.S. domiciled,
multinational firms. Accordingly, our results may not generalize to smaller firms.
Second, the firms in our sample are known to have (highly paid) tax directors. Clearly,
the presence of a tax director is prima facie evidence of these firms undertaking some
activity incremental to the duties of the top management team. Therefore, our results do
not imply that the CEO or CFO is never responsible for the firm’s tax planning function,
but only that this link is attenuated in the presence of a tax director. Third, like almost all
prior incentives research, we are unable to directly observe the tax directors’
compensation contracts. Therefore, we do know with certainty the precise mechanism(s)
through which his or her incentives are generated which, in turn, makes causality difficult
to establish. Fourth, we only investigate the monetary incentives provided to tax
directors. Tax directors’ (and other executives’) employment might be contingent on
some other measure of tax planning (e.g., Cash ETR), but the nature of our data inhibits
our ability to study termination as an incentive mechanism. Finally, we cannot directly
observe tax planning, so our measures of tax planning undoubtedly include measurement
error.
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Variable

Definition

Source and Data Codes

Total CEO Compensation, Total
Tax Director Compensation,
Total GC Compensation, and
Total CFO Compensation

Total annual compensation of the CEO,
Tax Director, General Counsel, and
CFO, respectively, where total annual
compensation is defined as the sum of
salary, bonus, the market value of target
long-term incentive payouts,
perquisites, the market value of
restricted stock, and the risk-neutral
(Black-Scholes) value of stock options
received during the year (with a 70%
discount applied to the time to
maturity).

Proprietary compensation
consultant data

CEO Compensation Mix, Tax
Director Compensation Mix, GC
Compensation Mix, and CFO
Compensation Mix

Ratio of variable compensation (i.e.,
bonus, restricted stock, and stock
options) to total compensation.

Proprietary compensation
consultant data

CEO Bonus Mix, Tax Director
Bonus Mix, GC Compensation
Mix, and CFO Bonus Mix

Ratio of the annual bonus to total
compensation.

Proprietary compensation
consultant data

Book-Tax Gap (BTG)

Difference between pre-tax book
income and taxable income.

Compustat PI less
TXFED/0.35 less PIFO
plus ∆TLCF

Scaled Book-Tax Gap

Book-Tax Gap scaled by average Total
Assets.

Compustat BTG divided
by average AT

GAAP ETR

The GAAP effective tax rate for the
year defined as total income-tax
expense scaled by pre-tax income.

Compustat TXT / PI

Current ETR

Current effective tax rate defined as
total income tax expense less deferred
income tax expense scaled by pre-tax
income.

Compustat ((TXT –
TXDI) / PI)

Deferred ETR

Deferred effective tax rate defined as
deferred income tax expense scaled by
pre-tax income.

Compustat (TXDI / PI)

Cash ETR

The cash effective tax rate for the year
defined as the sum of total income taxes
paid and the tax benefit of stock options
scaled by pre-tax income.

Compustat ((TXPD +
(TXBCO + TXBCOF)) /
PI)
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Cash ETR (w/o Option Benefit)

Cash effective tax rate excluding the tax
benefit of stock options.

Compustat TXPD/ PI

Cash ETR (3 Year)

Three-year Cash ETRs.

3 years leading

Pre-Tax Book Income

Pre-tax income less minority interest.

Compustat PI – MII

Taxable Income

Current federal tax expense grossed up
by the maximum federal statutory tax
rate plus foreign pre-tax income less the
change in the firm’s net operating loss
carryforward.

Compustat TXFED/0.35
+ PIFO - ∆TLCF

Taxable Income (Less Option
Benefit)

Taxable income less the tax benefit of
stock options grossed up by 35%.

TXFED/0.35 – (TXBCO
+ TXBCOF)/0.35 + PIFO
- ∆TLCF

Cash Flow From Operations

Operating cash flows.

Compustat OANCF

Tax Benefit of Stock Options

The tax benefit of stock options not
included in income.

Hand collection from
2002 to 2004, Compustat
TXBCO + TXBCOF
2005 and 2006

DTAX

Modified discretionary permanent
differences and ETR differentials as
defined in Frank et al. (2009) and
modified with the inclusion of estimated
foreign assets.

Compustat

SHELTER

Probability that the firm engages in a
tax shelter as defined in Wilson (2009).

Compustat Tax Shelter =
- 4.86 + 5.20*BookTax
Differences +
4.08*Discretionary
Accruals - 1.41*Leverage
+ 0.76*Size + 3.51*ROA
+ 1.72*ForeignIncome +
2.42*R&D

Market-to-Book Ratio

Market capitalization over the book
value of Total Shareholders’ Equity.

Compustat (CSHO *
PRCC_F) / (AT – LT)

Market Capitalization

The number of common shares
outstanding multiplied by the price per
share at the fiscal-year end.

Compustat CSHO *
PRCC_F

Revenue

Total net sales.

Compustat SALE

Return on Assets

Net income (or loss) scaled by
beginning total assets.

Compustat NIt / ATt-1
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Prior Year’s Return

Cumulative return on the firm’s stock
price over the previous year.

CRSP RET

Std. Dev. ROA

Standard deviation of Return on Assets
over the previous five fiscal years.

Std dev(Compustat NIt /
ATt-1)

Prior Year’s Volatility

The volatility of the firm’s monthly
stock returns over the previous year.

CRSP RET

Leverage

Long-term debt over total assets.

Compustat LT / AT

Change in Goodwill

The annual change in goodwill if
greater than 0; otherwise 0.

Compustat (∆GDWL/
Avg AT)

New Investment

The annual investment as described in
Richardson (2007) and defined as
Research and Development expense
plus Capital Expenditures plus
Acquisitions minus Sale of Property
minus Depreciation all scaled by
average Total Assets.

Compustat ((XRD +
CAPX + ACQ – SPPE –
DPC) / Avg. AT)

Foreign Assets

Estimated foreign assets using the
methodology described in Oler et al.
(2007) over Total Assets.

Compustat

Geographic Complexity

Estimated as the revenue-based
Hirfindahl-Hirschman indices
calculated as the sum of the squares of
each geographic segment’s sales as a
percentage of the total firm sales as
described in Bushman et al. (2004).

Compustat

Industry Complexity

Estimated as the revenue-based
Hirfindahl-Hirschman indices
calculated as the sum of the squares of
each industry segment’s sales as a
percentage of the total firm sales as
described in Bushman et al. (2004).

Compustat

Audit Fees

Total annual audit fees (in $millions)
paid by the firm.

Audit Analytics

Tax Fees

Total annual tax fees (in $millions) paid
by the firm over total assets.

Audit Analytics

Proportion Tax Fees

Total annual tax fees (in $millions) paid
by the firm over audit fees.

Audit Analytics

All compensation and control variables are measured as of time t except where specified. Dependent
variables (ETRs, taxable income, BTG, etc.) are computed at time t+1.
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Table 1
Panel A: Industry Composition of Sample
Industry
1. Mining and Construction
2. Food
3. Textiles, Printing, and Publishing
4. Chemicals
5. Pharmaceuticals
6. Extractive Industries
7. Durable Manufacturers
8. Computers
9. Transportation
10. Utilities
11. Retail
12. Financial Institutions
13. Insurance and Real Estate
14. Services
15. Other
Total

Proprietary Sample
Number
Frequency
23
1.98%
82
7.06%
74
6.37%
80
6.88%
57
4.91%
36
3.10%
277
23.84%
28
2.41%
43
3.70%
72
6.20%
137
11.79%
174
14.97%
59
5.08%
2
0.17%
18
1.55%
1,162
100%

Compustat
Number
Frequency
1,263
2.75%
859
1.87%
1,568
3.42%
955
2.08%
2,719
5.93%
1,686
3.67%
12,518
27.28%
2,338
5.09%
2,907
6.33%
1,797
3.92%
3,595
7.83%
6,806
14.83%
2,096
4.57%
3,862
8.42%
920
2.00%
45,889
100.00%

This table presents the industry classification of the proprietary sample and the Compustat database over
the 2002 to 2006 period. The number and frequency of the 1,162 sample firm-year observations and the
Compustat database from 2002 to 2006 are reported according to their industry classification following
Barth et al. (1998).

Panel B: Proportion of Sample Tax Expense and Cash Paid for Taxes
Ratio of Proprietary Sample to
Compustat

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Ratio of Proprietary Sample in S&P500 to
Total S&P500

Assets

Tax
Expense

Cash Paid
for Taxes

# of
Firms

Assets

Tax
Expense

Cash Paid
for Taxes

31.07%

36.05%

34.61%

50.80%

64.78%

64.67%

62.96%

30.32%

32.55%

32.09%

50.80%

64.64%

61.35%

62.55%

29.03%

28.35%

32.94%

51.20%

64.19%

58.61%

60.72%

28.84%

28.93%

36.27%

50.60%

62.51%

57.43%

58.26%

28.09%

28.45%

33.86%

49.20%

60.83%

55.26%

56.28%

Columns (1) to (3) of this table present the ratio of total assets (TA), total tax expense (TXT), and total cash
paid for taxes (TXPD) for the proprietary sample to the total Compustat population of firms with data
available, respectively. Columns (4) to (7) present the percentage of the S&P 500 firms in the proprietary
sample, and the ratio of total assets (TA), total tax expense (TXT), and total cash paid for taxes (TXPD)
for the S&P 500 firms in the proprietary sample to all S&P 500 firms.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
25th
Percentile

75th
Percentile

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

13,662,000
787,727
2,114,037
1,178,060
0.848
0.593
0.718
0.682
0.133
0.138
0.138
0.139

9,839,090
558,714
1,355,193
888,292
0.902
0.629
0.762
0.722
0.105
0.128
0.119
0.127

13,722,377
695,740
2,200,675
980,002
0.161
0.205
0.183
0.181
0.120
0.090
0.103
0.098

4,670,010
340,909
758,726
550,343
0.823
0.483
0.644
0.604
0.056
0.078
0.069
0.075

17,645,995
974,043
2,642,015
1,445,396
0.939
0.747
0.848
0.811
0.182
0.189
0.188
0.190

Tax Variables
Book-Tax Gap
Scaled Book-Tax Gap
GAAP ETR
Cash ETR
Cash ETR (w/o Option Benefit)
Cash ETR (3 Year)
Pre-Tax Book Income
Taxable Income (Less Option Benefit)
Taxable Income
Cash Flow From Operations
Tax Benefit of Stock Options
DTAX
SHELTER

274
0.050
0.297
0.287
0.283
0.331
1,838
1,270
1,397
2,283
44.50
0.102
0.941

67
0.016
0.313
0.233
0.230
0.267
683
446
470
796
0.00
0.010
0.981

2,153
0.340
0.148
0.262
0.262
0.274
3,730
3,178
2,984
4,126
374.27
0.478
0.114

-41
0.000
0.246
0.123
0.118
0.179
187
96
104
271
0.00
-0.015
0.946

358
0.043
0.358
0.338
0.333
0.356
1,791
1,387
1,419
2,140
11.90
0.075
0.994

Financial Variables
Market-to-Book Ratio
Market Capitalization
Revenue
Return on Assets
Prior Year’s Return
Std. ROA
Prior Year’s Volatility
Leverage

3.38
23,555
17,817
0.052
0.093
0.159
0.008
0.202

2.42
9,173
8,211
0.049
0.128
0.128
0.004
0.184

3.39
42,365
31,817
0.066
0.329
0.144
0.014
0.132

1.62
3,060
3,183
0.016
-0.021
0.065
0.002
0.104

3.79
21,329
17,854
0.090
0.257
0.203
0.008
0.285

Additional Control Variables
Change in Goodwill
New Investment
Foreign Assets
Geographic Complexity
Industry Complexity
Audit Fees
Tax Fees
Proportion Tax Fees

0.027
0.038
0.268
0.730
0.657
7,154
0.159
0.183

0.001
0.020
0.166
0.853
0.773
4,140
0.067
0.137

0.072
0.065
0.313
0.298
0.368
11,289
0.221
0.164

0.000
0.001
0.000
0.462
0.314
1,963
0.013
0.050

0.014
0.055
0.458
1.000
1.000
8,127
0.222
0.271

Compensation Variables
Total CEO Compensation
Total Tax Director Compensation
Total GC Compensation
Total CFO Compensation
CEO Compensation Mix
Tax Director Compensation Mix
GC Compensation Mix
CFO Compensation Mix
CEO Bonus Mix
Tax Director Bonus Mix
GC Bonus Mix
CFO Bonus Mix

This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 985 firm-year observations for which we have all
of the variables in the table. All variables are as defined in Appendix A.
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Table 3
Determinants of the GAAP and Cash Effective Tax Rates
GAAP ETR
Compensation
Level
Intercept
CEO Incentives
Tax Director Incentives
General Counsel Incentives
CFO Incentives
Return on Assets
Std. Dev. ROA
Log(Market Cap)
Leverage
Change in Goodwill
New Investment
Foreign Assets
Geographic Complexity
Industry Complexity
Proportion Tax Fees
Tax Fees
Nobs
Adjusted R2

(1)
0.411***
(3.09)
-0.001
(-0.09)
-0.028***
(-2.70)
0.001
(0.12)
0.008
(0.87)
0.343***
(3.67)
-0.089**
(-2.53)
0.008
(1.20)
-0.018
(-0.34)
-0.027
(-0.49)
0.074
(0.82)
0.037*
(1.83)
0.095***
(3.68)
-0.005
(-0.30)
-0.042
(-1.34)
0.012
(0.27)

(2)
0.461***
(4.26)

-0.024***
(-2.78)

0.347***
(3.72)
-0.09**
(-2.52)
0.009
(1.44)
-0.017
(-0.32)
-0.026
(-0.47)
0.074
(0.83)
0.036*
(1.85)
0.093***
(3.58)
-0.004
(-0.23)
-0.044
(-1.41)
0.014
(0.31)

Cash ETR

Compensation
Mix
(3)
0.205***
(2.90)
0.010
(0.21)
-0.075**
(-2.20)
-0.008
(-0.17)
0.019
(0.42)
0.371***
(3.95)
-0.091**
(-2.56)
0.005
(0.81)
-0.021
(-0.41)
-0.025
(-0.45)
0.081
(0.90)
0.037*
(1.86)
0.095***
(3.64)
0.000
(0.00)
-0.052*
(-1.66)
0.022
(0.49)

(4)
0.213***
(3.17)

-0.064*
(-1.95)

0.374***
(4.05)
-0.092**
(-2.57)
0.005
(0.89)
-0.021
(-0.41)
-0.025
(-0.45)
0.082
(0.93)
0.037*
(1.86)
0.094***
(3.63)
0.000
(0.03)
-0.053*
(-1.67)
0.022
(0.49)

Compensation
Level
(5)
0.260
(1.54)
-0.014
(-1.55)
-0.023
(-1.36)
0.011
(1.12)
0.022
(1.43)
0.264**
(2.21)
-0.118***
(-3.14)
0.003
(0.37)
-0.022
(-0.32)
0.196*
(1.70)
-0.362***
(-3.24)
0.018
(0.76)
0.044
(1.34)
0.006
(0.30)
-0.044
(-1.09)
0.062
(0.95)

(6)
0.354**
(2.33)

-0.015
(-1.11)

0.272**
(2.26)
-0.113***
(-3.03)
0.004
(0.50)
-0.019
(-0.28)
0.199*
(1.73)
-0.362***
(-3.23)
0.019
(0.83)
0.041
(1.22)
0.008
(0.37)
-0.050
(-1.21)
0.064
(0.98)

Compensation
Mix
(7)
0.234***
(2.76)
-0.107
(-1.59)
-0.040
(-0.62)
0.016
(0.23)
0.118
(1.62)
0.267**
(2.23)
-0.116***
(-3.07)
-0.001
(-0.12)
-0.024
(-0.34)
0.190
(1.64)
-0.354***
(-3.14)
0.017
(0.71)
0.040
(1.23)
0.009
(0.43)
-0.046
(-1.14)
0.063
(0.97)

(8)
0.204***
(2.65)

-0.010
(-0.21)

0.289**
(2.42)
-0.115***
(-3.07)
-0.001
(-0.08)
-0.021
(-0.30)
0.201*
(1.74)
-0.361***
(-3.26)
0.019
(0.81)
0.042
(1.26)
0.010
(0.48)
-0.055
(-1.36)
0.069
(1.06)

985

985

985

985

985

985

985

985

12.7%

12.6%

12.3%

12.3%

9.4%

8.9%

9.2%

8.7%

This table presents the estimates of equation (1) where the dependent variable is either the GAAP ETR or
the Cash ETR. GAAP ETR is the financial effective tax rate for the year defined as total income tax
expense scaled by pre-tax income (Compustat TXT / PI). Cash ETR is the cash effective tax rate for the
year defined as the sum of total income taxes paid and the tax benefit of stock options scaled by pre-tax
income ((TXPD + (TXBCO + TXBCOF)) / PI). Incentives for the CEO, tax director, general counsel, and
CFO are measured as either Compensation Level (i.e., the natural logarithm of total annual compensation)
or Compensation Mix (i.e., the ratio of variable compensation to total compensation). The remaining
variables are as defined in Appendix A. Year and industry indicators are included but unreported. tstatistics calculated using robust standard errors (based on two-way clustering by firm and year) are
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (twosided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4
Determinants of the Book-Tax Gap and Components
BTG
Intercept
CEO Incentives
Tax Director Incentives
General Counsel Incentives
CFO Incentives
Operating Cash Flow
Std. Dev. ROA
Log(Market Cap)
Leverage
Change in Goodwill
New Investment
Foreign Assets
Geographic Complexity
Industry Complexity
Proportion Tax Fees
Tax Fees
Nobs
Adjusted R2

Compensation Level
PBI
TI

0.183*
(1.78)
-0.001
(-0.17)
-0.007
(-1.08)
0.003
(0.85)
-0.004
(-0.74)
0.155*
(1.85)
0.020
(0.56)
0.002
(0.70)
-0.014
(-0.36)
0.065
(1.21)
-0.062
(-0.90)
0.000
(0.00)
0.024
(1.10)
-0.068*
(-1.96)
0.000
(0.02)
0.016
(1.12)

-0.110*
(-1.74)
-0.004
(-1.36)
-0.006
(-1.46)
0.003
(1.11)
0.005
(1.42)
0.836***
(11.99)
0.012
(0.42)
0.014***
(3.96)
-0.016
(-0.64)
-0.042
(-1.18)
0.091
(1.51)
0.020
(1.56)
0.036***
(2.73)
-0.040*
(-1.89)
0.031**
(2.03)
-0.004
(-0.50)

-0.14**
(-2.00)
-0.003
(-1.34)
0.002
(0.45)
0.001
(0.44)
0.004
(1.08)
0.591***
(11.22)
-0.002
(-0.11)
0.007***
(3.05)
-0.037*
(-1.77)
-0.067*
(-1.72)
0.089*
(1.81)
0.011
(0.93)
0.016
(0.96)
0.010
(0.44)
0.026*
(1.84)
-0.003
(-0.36)

985
7.6%

985
60.8%

985
50.1%

Compensation Mix
PBI
TI

Diff

BTG

0.240
(0.63)
0.020
(0.90)
3.340
(0.07)
0.390
(0.53)
0.100
(0.76)
17.250
(0.00)
0.370
(0.54)
3.910
(0.05)
0.840
(0.36)
0.650
(0.42)
0.000
(0.97)
0.890
(0.35)
1.770
(0.18)
6.550
(0.01)
0.170
(0.68)
0.030
(0.86)

0.100
(1.39)
-0.045
(-0.94)
-0.033
(-1.31)
0.055*
(1.81)
0.008
(0.24)
0.153*
(1.80)
0.019
(0.54)
0.001
(0.19)
-0.016
(-0.44)
0.063
(1.15)
-0.061
(-0.88)
-0.002
(-0.12)
0.024
(1.13)
-0.069*
(-1.91)
0.002
(0.08)
0.016
(1.16)

-0.117***
(-2.86)
-0.033**
(-1.98)
-0.001
(-0.06)
0.013
(0.81)
0.033*
(1.91)
0.839***
(12.37)
0.012
(0.43)
0.012***
(4.23)
-0.015
(-0.62)
-0.044
(-1.22)
0.089
(1.46)
0.019
(1.63)
0.036**
(2.49)
-0.041*
(-1.83)
0.031**
(2.18)
-0.004
(-0.46)

-0.091**
(-2.19)
-0.013
(-0.62)
0.027
(1.62)
-0.018
(-1.04)
0.019
(1.11)
0.593***
(11.16)
-0.001
(-0.05)
0.007***
(3.04)
-0.035*
(-1.69)
-0.068*
(-1.73)
0.088*
(1.76)
0.011
(1.00)
0.017
(0.96)
0.010
(0.38)
0.025*
(1.73)
-0.003
(-0.37)

985
8.0%

985
60.8%

985
50.3%

Diff
0.470
(0.49)
0.970
(0.32)
3.910
(0.05)
3.700
(0.05)
0.730
(0.39)
17.450
(0.00)
0.350
(0.56)
3.540
(0.06)
0.790
(0.37)
0.620
(0.43)
0.000
(0.98)
0.800
(0.37)
1.710
(0.19)
6.600
(0.01)
0.240
(0.62)
0.010
(0.92)

This table presents the estimates of equation (2) where the dependent variable in the first column is the
Book-Tax Gap (BTG). The second and third columns present results when the Book-Tax Gap is
disaggregated into its two components, Pre-Tax Book Income (PBI) and Taxable Income (TI), and the
equations are jointly estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression. The fourth column, Diff, presents
the results of a chi-square test of the difference between the estimated coefficients in the PBI and TI
models. Incentives for the CEO, tax director, general counsel, and CFO are measured as either the natural
logarithm of total compensation or compensation mix. The remaining variables are as defined in Appendix
A. Year and industry indicators are included but unreported. t-statistics calculated using robust standard
errors (based on two-way clustering by firm and year) are reported in parentheses below the coefficient
estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 5
Measures of Tax Aggressiveness (DTAX and Shelter)
DTAX
Intercept
CEO Incentives
Tax Director Incentives
General Counsel Incentives
CFO Incentives
Return on Assets
Std. Dev. ROA
Log(Market Cap)
Leverage
Change in Goodwill
New Investment
Foreign Assets
Geographic Complexity
Industry Complexity
Proportion Tax Fees
Tax Fees
Nobs
Adjusted R2

0.435
(0.74)
-0.013
(-0.38)
-0.079
(-0.83)
-0.048
(-1.08)
0.079
(0.82)
-0.006
(-0.01)
-0.317
(-0.38)
0.008
(0.23)
-0.047
(-0.18)
1.483**
(2.23)
-1.119*
(-1.86)
0.032
(0.23)
0.006
(0.04)
-0.019
(-0.15)
0.586**
(2.35)
-0.270
(-0.92)
985
10.4%

Shelter
0.579
(0.84)

-0.072
(-1.03)

0.018
(0.04)
-0.383
(-0.46)
0.008
(0.21)
-0.031
(-0.12)
1.489**
(2.25)
-1.136*
(-1.89)
0.031
(0.22)
0.003
(0.02)
-0.020
(-0.15)
0.570**
(2.36)
-0.274
(-0.94)
985
10.1%

0.523***
(4.53)
0.001
(0.20)
0.003
(0.37)
0.005
(1.04)
-0.002
(-0.32)
0.183*
(1.87)
-0.221
(-1.64)
0.033***
(6.08)
-0.073*
(-1.79)
0.025
(0.54)
-0.038
(-0.58)
0.019
(1.07)
-0.060**
(-2.38)
-0.006
(-0.43)
-0.051
(-1.57)
0.064
(1.59)
985
41.9%

0.542***
(5.68)

0.005
(0.72)

0.184*
(1.88)
-0.216
(-1.64)
0.033***
(6.32)
-0.074*
(-1.83)
0.025
(0.53)
-0.035
(-0.53)
0.019
(1.08)
-0.060**
(-2.43)
-0.005
(-0.39)
-0.051
(-1.57)
0.065
(1.62)
985
41.9%

This table presents the estimates of equations (3) and (4) where the dependent variable is either DTAX (i.e.,
excess permanent differences and ETR differentials as defined in Frank et al., 2009 and modified with the
inclusion of estimated foreign assets) or Shelter (i.e., Wilson’s (2009) measure of the probability that the
firm engages in a tax shelter). Incentives for the CEO, tax director, general counsel, and CFO are measured
as the level of total compensation. The remaining variables are as defined in Appendix A. Year and
industry indicators are included but unreported. t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors (based on
two-way clustering by firm and year) are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and
*** denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6
Reverse Regression - Compensation Level
Intercept
Return on Assets
Std. Dev. ROA
Log(Market Cap)
Leverage
Change in Goodwill
New Investment
Foreign Assets
Geographic Complexity
Industry Complexity
Proportion Tax Fees
Tax Fees
GAAP ETR
Cash ETR

GAAP ETR vs. Cash ETR (F-stat)
p-value
Nobs
Adjusted R2

CEO

Tax

GC

CFO

12.617***
(26.57)
2.291***
(4.04)
-1.771***
(-2.66)
0.381***
(10.99)
-0.180
(-0.65)
0.027
(0.06)
0.533
(0.92)
-0.046
(-0.33)
-0.197
(-1.10)
0.184
(1.63)
-0.375
(-1.59)
0.778**
(2.32)
-0.138
(-0.54)
0.044
(0.25)

10.015***
(28.74)
1.829***
(4.53)
0.317
(0.60)
0.350***
(12.55)
0.018
(0.08)
-0.045
(-0.17)
0.231
(0.60)
0.050
(0.47)
-0.056
(-0.39)
-0.048
(-0.56)
0.125
(0.64)
0.093
(0.36)
-0.363***
(-2.63)
0.123
(0.98)

10.85***
(24.79)
2.104***
(4.10)
0.955
(1.39)
0.294***
(7.73)
-0.073
(-0.26)
0.029
(0.07)
0.557
(1.10)
0.015
(0.13)
-0.263
(-1.43)
0.134
(1.22)
-0.239
(-1.00)
0.551*
(1.70)
-0.140
(-0.70)
0.262*
(1.71)

11.041***
(38.60)
2.041***
(5.21)
-0.374
(-0.65)
0.287***
(12.55)
0.066
(0.33)
0.069
(0.24)
0.261
(0.70)
-0.005
(-0.05)
-0.212*
(-1.76)
0.120
(1.54)
-0.315*
(-1.77)
0.36*
(1.65)
-0.087
(-0.64)
0.155
(1.33)

0.008
0.927
985
36.1%

4.90**
0.027
985
44.9%

3.27*
0.071
985
31.7%

0.64
0.426
985
43.1%

This table presents the estimates of regressing CEO, tax director, general counsel, and CFO incentive
compensation on economic determinants of incentive compensation and the GAAP ETR and Cash ETR.
The dependent variables are measured as the natural logarithm of the level of total annual compensation.
The remaining variables are as defined in Appendix A. Year and industry indicators are included but
unreported. t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors (based on two-way clustering by firm and
year) are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The F-statistic and associated p-value
from the test of the equality of the estimated coefficients on GAAP ETR and Cash ETR are reported. *, **,
and *** denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

50

Table 7
Propensity Score Matched-Pair Analysis
Panel A: Differences in GAAP ETR
Treatment

Wilcoxon

p-value

t-statistic

p-value

Mean
Difference in
GAAP ETR

Median
Difference in
GAAP ETR

0.557

0.577

-0.446

0.655

-0.003

0.005

-4.050***

0.000

-3.519***

0.000

-0.029

-0.018

General Counsel Compensation

0.321

0.749

0.202

0.840

0.001

0.000

CFO Compensation

-0.890

0.373

-0.230

0.818

-0.002

-0.006

CEO Comp Mix

-0.477

0.633

-1.224

0.221

-0.009

0.000

-2.204**

0.028

-2.223**

0.027

-0.019

-0.011

General Counsel Comp Mix

0.275

0.784

0.125

0.901

0.001

0.000

CFO Comp Mix

-1.389

0.165

-0.734

0.463

-0.005

-0.008

CEO Compensation
Tax Director Compensation

Tax Director Comp Mix

Panel B: Differences in Cash ETR
Wilcoxon

p-value

t-statistic

p-value

Mean
Difference in
Cash ETR

CEO Compensation

0.062

0.951

0.402

0.688

0.005

-0.003

Tax Director Compensation

0.679

0.497

-0.004

0.997

0.000

0.015

General Counsel Compensation

-0.233

0.816

-0.712

0.477

-0.009

0.000

CFO Compensation

0.920

0.357

1.567

0.118

0.020

0.000

CEO Comp Mix

-1.381

0.167

-1.079

0.281

-0.014

-0.009

Tax Director Comp Mix

0.110

0.912

0.180

0.857

0.002

0.000

General Counsel Comp Mix

0.592

0.554

0.687

0.492

0.009

0.000

CFO Comp Mix

0.989

0.323

0.793

0.428

0.010

0.011

Treatment

Median
Difference in
Cash ETR

This table presents the results of the difference in GAAP ETR (Panel A) and Cash ETR (Panel B) between
the matched pairs of firms for different treatments which are either the level or mix of compensation for the
CEO, tax director, general counsel, and CFO. The first column presents the treatment for which we
modeled the conditional probability of having a certain level of the treatment (conditional on economic and
tax planning characteristics) and then matched firms with the most similar conditional probability of
treatment but the largest difference in the observed level of treatment. The second and third columns
present a Wilcoxon statistic of the rank-sum difference in the median ETR between the matched pairs of
firms and the corresponding p-value (two-sided). The fourth and fifth columns present a t-statistic for a test
of the difference in the mean ETR between the matched pairs and the associated p-value (two-sided). The
sixth and seventh columns present the mean and median difference in GAAP ETR (Panel A) and Cash ETR
(Panel B) between the matched pairs. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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